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ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini menguji hubungan antara kebijakan keuangan (kebijakan hutang, kebijakan investasi, dan
kebijakan dividen) dan manajemen laba yang dimoderasi oleh variabel kontekstual seperti mekanisme internal
Tata Kelola Perusahaan. Secara khusus, penelitian ini menguji apakah variabel moderator mempengaruhi
hubungan antara kebijakan keuangan dan manajemen laba. Sampel dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan
sektor manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) dan terdaftar di Bursa Efek Kuala Lumpur
(KLSE) yang memberikan laporan keuangan tahunan dari tahun 2004 sampai 2010, Analisis data pada
penelitian ini didasarkan pada data 2005–2010. Teori yang mendasari adalah teori keagenan. Hasil
menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar di BEI dan KLSE, tiga kebijakan (kebijakan hutang
utang, dividen dan kebijakan investasi kebiajakan) berpengaruh terhadap manajemen laba (sebelum dampak
GCG). GCG menyebabkan perbedaan dalam hasil perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia dan KLSE.
Hasil untuk perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia setelah dampak dari GCG bahwa hanya
kebijakan dividen dan kebijakan investasi yang mempengaruhi manajemen laba. Sebaliknya hasil kontras untuk
perusahaan yang terdaftar di KLSE setelah dampak dari acara GCG bahwa hanya kebijakan kebijakan utang dan
investasi yang mempengaruhi manajemen laba. Hasil untuk perusahaan yang terdaftar di KLSE ini
menunjukkan bahwa manajemen yang lebih over-investasi, karena dana internal lebih banyak digunakan untuk
investasi dan pembayaran utang.
Kata kunci: kebijakan hutang, kebijakan dividen, kebijakan investasi, manajemen laba, tata kelola perusahaan
yang baik
ABSTRACT
This study examines the relationship between financial policy (debt policy, investment policy, and
dividend policy) and earnings management moderated by contextual variable such as the internal
mechanism of Corporate Governance. Specifically, this study examines whether each moderated
variables or the interaction some of them influence the relationship between financial policy and
earnings management. The sample in this study is the manufacturing sector companies listed in
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) that
providing annual financial reporting from 2004 through 2010, Analysis data on this study are based on
data 2005-2010. The theory underlying the agency theory. The results show that the listed companies
in BEI and the KLSE, the three policies (debt debt policy, dividend and investment policy) effect on
the management of earnings (before any impact of the GCG). Good corporate governance leads to
differences in the results of companies listed on the Stock Exchange and the KLSE. Results for
companies listed on the Stock Exchange after the impact of the GCG show that only the dividend
policy and investment policies that affect the management of earnings. These results indicate that
firms in Indonesia under Investment. In contrast results for companies listed on the KLSE after the
impact of GCG show that policy of debt and investment policies affect the management of earnings.
Results for companies listed on KLSE indicates that the more over-Investment management, the more
widely used internal funds for investment and debt payments.
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INTRODUCTION
The managerial relation is one of the
key agency problems since principal (share-
holder) and agent (management) can have
different interest and a conflict of interest.
Whereas shareholder seek the maximization
of their wealth and encourage the maxi-
mization of the firm’s value, managers’
interests are usually linked to the compen-
sation both with money and perquisites. In
turn, managers could be prone to run the
company even in detriment of the firm’s
value provided that they could satisfy their
own utility function through some financial
decisions such as over investment,debt
policy, over optimal diversification or ta-
king risk beyond the optimal level for the
company, return of dividend to share-
holder/dividend policy. The that firm finan-
cial policy will appear on financial state-
ment especially at the earnings infor mation.
Earnings information is important indi-
cator for evaluating firm financial perfor-
mance. Manager determine the short term
reported earnings of their companies by :  1)
Managing, providing leadership, and direc-
ting the use of resources in operation, 2)
Selecting the timing of some non operating
events, and 3) Choosing the accounting
methods that are used to measure short
term earnings. Most managers always exert
a stable financial performance. They know
that managing earnings can be part of mana
gers’ job. Growing systematic evidence
supports the argument that earnings mana-
gement is a common practice in firms.
Managers of firms routinely manipulate or
“manage” reported financial information in
response to a wide variety of incentives
with potentially significant consequences to
the firm’s management, investor, creditor,
and others.
 The level of earnings management will
be higher if management has incentive and
opportunity to do so.  The opportunity to
engage earnings management exists when
the manager knows some things, which
others do not. The existence of information
asymmetry between firm management and
firm shareholder is an necessary condition,
which must be met for earnings manage-
ment to exist. When information asymmetry
is high, stakeholders do not have necessary
resources, incentives or access to relevant
information to monitor manager’s action .
On the contrary, the Corporate Gover-
nance mechanism can decrease the conflict
of interests between managers and share-
holders. Because Conflict of interests requi-
red some mechanism to ensure the protec-
tion of investors’ rights. Therefore, corpo-
rate governance arises as a set of constraints
to shape th bargaining over the quasi-rents
generated or the way used by the suppliers
of finance in order to assure the return on
their investment. More specifically, corpo-
rate governance focuses on the mechanisms
to reduce the array of agency cost originated
by the nexus of contracts in the firm. This
research use internal corporate governance
mechanism such as control of board of
commissioner, board of director, share-
holder and audit committee. So corporate
governance mechanism can reduce mana-
gement behavior to do earning manage-
ment.
This research is motivated to extend
previous earnings management research
which focused on examining financial poli-
cy (debt, dividend and investment policy)
and consequences of earnings management
practices. Very little has been conducted in
investigating environment surrounding ear-
nings management practices. These studies
consider corporate governance (CG) as
condition that reduces the opportunity
practice of earnings management.
This research was the comparative stu-
dy between corporate listing in Indonesia
Stock Exchange and the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange. Reasons for choosing
Malaysia to be compared with Indonesia as
The Influence Of Financial Policies … --Wahidahwati 509
an object of observation are as follows: 1).
The growth rate of Indonesia and Malaysia
are not far different meaning there are
similarities in terms of economic growth.  2).
Indonesian inflation rate higher than the
country of Malaysia 3). The proportion of
debt used by companies varies between
countries both Indonesia and Malaysia. This
difference is due to the differences in risk-
free interest rate, risk premium of debt.
Interest rates vary between countries due to
economic conditions affecting interest rates.
4) Companies in the control of the family
and concentrated ownership. Companies in
Indonesia Malaysia, even in Asia are histori-
cally and sociologically owned and control-
led by the family.
Aim of research is to investigate the
moderating effect of Corporate Governance
(CG) on the association between the finan-
cial policy (debt, dividend and investment
policy) and the magnitude of earnings
management.
The research problem are: Does finan-
cial policy (debt, dividend and investment
policy) influence on Earning management,
if moderated by corporate governance
mechanism ?
This research give some contribution to
theory, concept and policy. 1). Contribution
to theory, to extend association literature by
examining the impact of investment oppor-
tunity set level, as a condition that represent
the wider opportunity to practice earnings
management, on the association between
financial policy (debt, dividend and invest-
ment policy) and the magnitude of earnings
management. Examining the interaction bet-
ween investment opportunity set and finan-
cial policy (debt, dividend and investment
policy) on the earnings management is
important to the theory that investment
opportunity set can increase magnitude of
earnings management related to a number
of incentives. This research also contributes
to extend association literature by exami-
ning the impact of corporate governance, as
a condition that represent the narrow
opportunity to practice earnings manage-
ment, on the association between financial
policy (debt, dividend and investment
policy) and the magnitude of earnings mana
gement. Examining the interaction between
corporate governance and financial policy
(debt, dividend and investment policy) on
the earnings management is important to
the theory that corporate governance can
decrease magnitude of earnings manage-
ment that related to a number of incentives.
2). Contribution to concept, to positive
accounting theory wish give empirical evi-
dence about efforts management to hide
corporate performance through deed ear-
ning management that based to implemen-
tation of financial policy. The result of this
research will also be useful to investor for
better understanding reported earnings. In-
vestors should not naively use the accoun-
ting income numbers without any adjust-
ment for manipulation possibility of repor-
ted income. 3). Contribution to policy, refer
to standards setter. Accounting standard
setter may find the result of this study
useful for evaluating the mandated additio-
nal disclosure that give sufficient informa-
tion for better understanding reported ear-
ning. Finally, the result of this research will
be useful to auditor for incentives to hold
responsible for better quality for financial
reporting of firm.
THEORITICAL REVIEW
Corporate Policy and Earning Manage-
ment
There is extensive previous literature.
The effect of debt and debt covenants on
earnings management. The finding have
been consistent with the view that for firms
with high levels of debt, greater income
increasing accrual are undertaken in the
years which the debt constraints are likely
be binding and income decreasing accruals
are undertaken in other years. An appealing
explanation is that the managers’ perceived
cost of technical default of debt covenants is
higher than the perceive loss in value
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resulting from managing the discretionary
accrual. Therefore, they engage in income
increasing accruals when the debt covenant
are likely to be binding and in income
decreasing to ‘bank’ some of the income for
future periods of possible binding debt
constraints. If this is true, in a pooled cross-
sectional analysis, irrespective of whether
the debt constraints are binding or not, the
magnitude of discretionary accrual must be
significantly higher for firms with more
debt than for firms with less debt. Gul et al.,
(2006) gave evidence that debt levels are
also significantly associated with the magni-
tude of discretionary accruals, suggesting
that managers of high-debt firms are more
likely to manage earnings than low debt
firms.
HYPOTHESIS
Influence of Corporate Policy (Debt Policy,
Dividend Policy And Investment Policy)
on Earnings Management (H1)
An imbalance of information between
the company management with sharehol-
ders is an essential condition for the practice
of earnings management. Gul et al, (2003);
Fanani, (2006) found evidence that firms
have high debt levels tend to carry out
earnings management because it can reduce
the accuracy of the information from the
profits. It can also be concluded that the
level of debt and earning management has a
positive relationship.
The ratio of dividend payments and
profits of the period.  The ratio of dividend
payments reflects the company's policy to
pay the rights of shareholders, usually
causing the positive sentiment from the
market. Savov, (2006) found evidence that
the announcement of dividend has a posi-
tive relationship with stock returns. This
means there is a positive relationship bet-
ween dividend policy with earnings mana-
gement (Savov, 2006; Achmad, Subekti dan
Sari, 2007).
Managers choose the level of invest-
ment spending could maximize shareholder
wealth without considering the current
interest in the company. So that the policy
could lead to investment spending investors
to profit management. With the above argu-
ments, proposed the following research
hypothesis:
H1: Debt Policy, Dividend Policy And
Investment Policy Affect Of Earnings
Management.
Influence of Corporate Policy (Debt Policy,
Dividend Policy and Invesment Policy) on
Earning Management if Moderated byThe
Corporate Governance Mechanism. (H2a,
H2b, H2C)
Badera, (2006) found that the oversight
mechanism, represented by board member
has a relationship with the company's per-
formance, in other words the greater the
commissioners the more serious in mana-
ging the company's management to increase
corporate performance. This can be conclu-
ded that the greater proportion of the board
of commissioners will reduce management
to manage earnings because they feel there
is strict control of the board of commis-
sioners.
Xie, Davidson and Dadalt, (2003) found
that the audit committee from outside can
protect the interests of shareholders from
actions earnings management made by
management. Carcello (2006), April Klein
(2006), also found evidence that the audit
committee is significant negatively related
to behavior management in the earnings
management .
While research conducted in Indonesia,
there are differences such discoveries made
by Rachmawati and Triatmoko, (2007)
found that there is a negative influence and
significance of the audit committee and
discreationari Accrual, contrary Siallagan,
and Machfoedz, (2006) found that the
existence of the audit committee has a
positive influence quality and value of
corporate profits. Siallagan, and Machfoedz,
(2006) found that leverage can reduce the
conflict between the manager and the
bondholder.
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Siallagan, and Machfoedz, (2006) found
that leverage can reduce the conflict bet-
ween the manager and the bondholder.
Taswan, (2009), found that the debt has a
positive relationship to company perfor-
mance. This result means the management
wants to be judged good performance in the
market although the risk of company, where
risk can be indicated by the debt that causes
a risk of bankruptcy for the company. In
order that the performance is always judged
whether the companies have high debt will
cause management to use methods that
increase the accounting income.
From the above description, concluded
that the research aims to see whether the
presence of corporate governance policies
will minimize the impact of debt on ear-
nings management. Pratana and Mach-
foedz, (2003); Xie, Biao, Wallace and Peter,
(2003) concluded that the independent
commissioner could affect earnings mana-
gement actions. In this study, measurement
for the CG do not use measurements sepa-
rated as above, but using the measurement
of all indicators that form the internal
control mechanism of the CG included
(Board of Commissioners, the Audit Com-
mittee, as shareholders and management)
by using factor score. Thus derived hypo-
theses:
H2a:   The negative effect of debt policy on
the management of profit when
controlled by Corporate Governance
mechanism
Provision of dividend policy will give a
positive signal to the market, means that the
dividend policy will increase the market
performance. Therefore the higher the pay
out devidend policy will affect management
behavior to manage earnings. It is therefore
necessary internal controls such as non-
executive directors, the board of commis-
sioners is expected to weaken the influence
of dividends policy on the earnings mana-
gement. Savov, (2006) states to a certain
level, the higher dividends the lower the
company's performance because the compa-
ny may lose investment opportunities due
to lack of cash. So that a high dividend
would encourage managers to manage ear-
nings in order not seen their performance
declined.  The existence of the audit commit
tee is expected to reduce the behavior of
managers in the earnings management if
associated with dividend policy. Large
agency conflicts will occur in the condition
if the number of audit committees are less
and do not have financial expertise. Thus
derived hypotheses:
H2b: Dividend Policy a Negative Effect on
Earnings Management When Control
led By Corporate Governance Mecha-
nism.
However, shareholders raised gap that
reinvest in projects with net present value of
the negative is a form of efficiency and
delays to their welfare, so that shareholders
will respond to negative policies of such
companies. In other words, if the company
carrying out projects worth now positive,
the investment will be taken positively by
the market because it expected to generate
investment income flows and cash flow will
be the future that ultimately increase the
value of the company. With the GCG it is
expected that expenditure will reduce the
company's investment management to pro-
fit management.
H2C : Investment Policies Negative Effect
on Earnings Management When is
Controlled by The Internal Mecha-
nism the Corporate Governance
RESEARCH METHOD
Population and Sample
Population of this study is all the manu-
facturing companies listing in the Indonesia
Stock Exchange and the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange. The sampling technique
was purposive sampling. Sample selection
criteria in this study are:
1.  Emiten which includes manufacturing
companies. The use of a manufacturing
industry group is intended to avoid the
characteristic differences between manu-
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facturing firms and non-manufacturing.
Besides manufacturing companies also
have a higher sensitivity to any event or
occurrence.
2.  Emiten have included financial reporting
as of December 31, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009 and 2010. The choice of the based on
the premise that as of December 31 is an
audited report, so that financial state-
ments can be more reliable.
3.  Based on these criteria, the number of
samples used in this study to sample as
many as 228 companies listing on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange and 168 for
sample listing in Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange.
Measurement of Dependent Variables:
Measurement of Earnings Management
The discretionary component of the
total accrual is estimated with the modified
Jones (1991) Discretionary accrual (DA) for
each firm I in industry j are defined as the
residual from the regression of total accrual
(the difference between Cash from Ope-
rations and Net Income) on two factors that
explain non discretionary accruals, the
increase in revenue and the level of fixed
assets subject to depreciation.
DAit = TAit/Ait-1 – [1(1/Ait-1)+2(REVit-
RECit)/Ait-1)+ 3(PPEit/Ait)
Where:
DAit = Discretionary accrual for firm i in
 year t
TAit = Total accruals for firm I in year t
Ait-1 = Total assets for firm I in year t
REVit= Change in net sales for firm I in
 year t
RECit = Change in net receivable for firm i
 in year t
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equip-
ment for firm I in year t
Where 1, 2 dan 3 are the industry-specific
estimated coefficients from the following
cross-sectional regression.
TAit/Ait-1 = 1(1/Ait-1)+2(REVit-RECit)/
Ait-1)+ 3(PPEit/Ait) +i
Measurement of Independent Variable
Debt Policy
Debt is measured as current and non-
current borrowings divided by total asset.
Because book values are used to write debt
contracts this measure more accurately pro-
xies for debt holder and shareholder con-
flicts than market-based measures (Tarjo
2005), (Wahyudi and Pawestri 2006)
Mathematically debt policy variable (LEV)
can be formulated as follows:
LEVit      = NBUit
                                 Ait
LEVit     = Leverage (debt policy) for firm i in
 year t
NBUit   = Book value of total debt for firm i
 in year t
Ait  = Total Asset for firm i in year t
Dividend Policy
Dividend Policy Variable (DIVD) is
collected using proxy of dividend payout ratio
which is referred to by Ismiyanti & Hanafi,
2003; Wahyudi and Pawestri, 2006.
Mathematically dividend policy (DIVD)
can be formulated as follows:
DIVD =  DIVDit –  DIVDit-1
Where :
DPSit : Divident per-share for firm i in
year t
EPSit : Earning per-share for firm i in
year t
DIVD : Changes in corporate dividend in
year t
Invesment Policy
Invesment Policy Variable (INV) is
referred to by Hermeindit (2004).
Mathematically  Invesment  policy (INV)
can be formulated as follows:
INVit   = AKIit
                PPEit
Where :
INVit : Invesment for firm i in year t
DIVD it
 DPSit
 EPSit
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AKIit : Cash flow of Invetasi activity for
 firm i in year t
PPEit : Book value of fixed asset for firm i
 in year t
Measurement of Moderating Variable:
Good Corporate Governance Mechanism
(GCG)
In this research by being in line with
Klapper and Love, (2002); Ali syah, Butt and
Hasan, (2009), the quality of corporate gover
nance mechanism (CG) has been estimated
by the use of following equetion.
GCG = f (BOC, AC, D, I).
BOC = Board Of Commisionaire
M = Management
AC = Audit Committee
I = Investor
Above diagram represents the theoreti-
cal frame work for the measurement of
quality of  Good Corporate Governance. In
each of company above mentioned func-
tions has been identified and on the fulfil-
lment of codes and literature’s criteria
marks has been assigned to each company.
Each function has been given a weight on
the basis of its importance as far as control
on earnings management is concerned.
After allocating the marks and getting their
respective weights, weighted mark have
been calculated. To obtain the aggregate
score of each company calculated weighted
marks have been summed up. Criteria and
form used for measuring of corporate gover
nance mechanism is attached in appendix 1.
Control Variable:  SIZE
Firm size is included as a control
variable in the analysis because it has been
found to be associated with various firm
characteristics. Firm size is measured as log
natural of the book value of total assets,
which is logged to normalize the variable
and labeled LNASSET.
THE SYSTEM CONTAINS TWO EQUA-
TIONS
Hypothesis 1 a – 1c (Model 1)
DAit = 1.1 + 1.1LEVit + 1.2DIVDit +
1.3INVit +1.1SIZEit + eit
Hypothesis 2 a – 2c  (Model 2)
DAit  = 3.1 + 3.1 LEV + 32DIVD + 3.3INV
+ 3.1CG + 3.2 LEV *CG +
3.3DIVD*CG + 3.4 INV*CG + 3.1
SIZE + e
Table 1
Descriptive statistical
Variabel N Rata-rata Median Deviasi Standar
Sample of BEI
  DA
                 LEV
DIVD
 INV
GCG
SIZE
Sample of KLSE
  DA
  LEV
DIVD
  INV
  GCG
  SIZE
228
228
228
228
228
228
168
168
168
168
168
168
-0,028
0,44001
1,4483
-0,2020
0,6079
13,6941
-0,0011
0,3835
0,3617
-2.1138
0,8653
12,5519
-0,0250
0,4046
0,0058
0,1645
0,6169
13,4682
0,0015
0,3654
0,0008
-0,1303
0,8700
12,2423
0,1073
0,2210
21,1859
0.2597
0,0906
1,6058
0,0835
0,2000
3,0761
17,7973
0,0609
1,1736
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The above table shows that earnings
management (DA) on companies listed on
Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) had an ave-
rage of 0.028 is higher when compared to
companies listed on the KLSE had average
earnings of the management of -0.001,
which both have the negative coefficient.
This indicates that during the years of
observation founded that both companies
on the BEI and the KLSE routinely do
practice earnings management, which
management prefers policies that reduce
earnings. Average investment rate (INV) on
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange (BEI) in the amount of -0.2020
with a standard deviation of  0.2597 while
the KLSE for the average investment rate of
-2.1138, with standard deviation of 17.7923.
These results indicate that variations of
invesment  in the KLSE larger than in the
BEI, average of dividends (DIVD) in compa-
nies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange
(BEI) of 1.4483 while the KLSE for the
average of dividend of  0.3617. These results
indicate that the variation dividend in the
BEI larger than in the KLSE. Standard devi-
ation of the other variables are relatively
small in value, it shows that behavior of
earnings management of firms in the sam-
ple are not too varied. Standard deviation
values are not too big also shows that the
deviation of each variable is not significant.
TestingThe Classical Assumptions
Test classical assumptions consists of nor-
mality test, multikolinierity test, autocorre-
lation test and heterokedastisitas test, where
everything is free from interference, so that
hypothesis testing can be done.
Results of Test Statistics: for Companies
Listing on The Indonesia Stock Exchange
(ISE) and The KLSE
Model 1
DAit   = 1.1 + 1.1LEVit + 1.2DIVDit +
1.3INVit +1.4 GCG +1.1SIZEit +
eit
Indonesia MalaysiaVariabel B t Sig B t Sig
Model 1
   Intercept 0,0580 0,917 0,360 0,0470 0,508 0,612
   LEV 0,0806 2,460 0,015** 0,0240 2.743 0,007***
   INV 0,1390 5,217 0,000*** 0,0210 2,739 0,007***
DIVD 0,0008 2,632 0,009** 0,0064 0,593 0,554
   GCG -0,1520 -1.938 0,054* -0,1710 -2.14 0,034**
   SIZE -0,0005 -0,144 0,910 0,0087 2,075 0,040**
R2 0,118 (0,094) 0,152 (0,120)
F 7,345*** 4,714***
*** Statistically significant at 1%
** Statistically significant at the 5%
* Statistically significant at 10%
Model 2:
DAit  = 2.1 + 2.1 LEVit + 2.2DIVDit + 2.3INVit + 2.1GCGit + 2.2 LEVit *GCGit + 2.3 DIVDit
*GCGit + 2.4 INVit*GCGit + 2.1 SIZEit + eit
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Indonesia MalaysiaVariabel B t Sig B t Sig
Model 2
Intercept 0,2410 4,580 0,000*** 0,2580 4,264 0,000***
LEVit 0,0055 0,256 0,798 0,0399 2,411 0,017**
INVit -0,3300 -4,224 0,000*** -0,0127 -0,719 0,473
DIVDit -0,0129 -0,944 0,346 0,0306 0,926 0,356
GCGit -0,0399 -0,591 0,555 -0,0041 -0.029 0,977
LEVit *GCGit 0,0506 0,593 0,554 0,3140 1,118 0,265
INVit*GCGit -0,5010 -4,714 0,000*** -0,0078 2,136 0,034**
DIVDit
*GCGit
-0,0013 -2,711 0,007*** -0,0125 -0,448 0,655
SIZEit -0,0112 -3.465 0.001*** 0,0106 2,517 0.013**
R2(Adjusted) 0,201 (0,172) 0,157(0,114)
   F 6,842*** 3,633***
*** Statistically significant at 1%
** Statistically significant at the 5%
* Statistically significant at 10%
1.  Testing goodness of fit
Model 1
F value for companies listing on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange was 7.345 with a
probability value of 0.000 is statistically
significant. R2  is 0.118 which means that the
earnings management (DA) is explained by
leverage, changes in dividends, investment,
corporate governance and firm size by
11.8%. The remaining 88.2% is explained by
variables other variables which are not
included in Model 1. So also for companies
listing on the KLSE,  F value  is 4.714 with a
probability value of 0.000 is statistically
significant. Value of R2 is 0.152 which means
the ability of independent variables explain
the dependent variable of 15.2%.
Model 2
F value for companies listing on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange is  6.842 and the
probability value of 0.000, are statistically
significant. Value of R2 is 0.201, which
means that earnings management is explai-
ned by leverage, changes in dividends,
investments, corporate governance and the
interaction of 20.1%. The remaining 79.9% is
explained by other variables that are not
included in Model 2. So also for companies
listing on the KLSE,  F value  is  3.633, the
probability value of 0.001 are statistically
significant. Value of R2 is 0.157, which
means the ability of independent variables
explain the dependent variable of 15.7%.
The remaining 84.3% is explained by other
variables that are not included in Model 2.
2  Hypothesis Testing Results
a.  Analysis for company that listing in
Indonesia Stock Exchange
Model 1
On Model 1, the coefficient of the vari-
able LEV (β1.1) is 0.0806 and t value of 2.460
with a probability value 0.015, thus statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level according to
the predictions. This means that the greater
the level of corporate debt policy, the grea-
ter the level of earnings management (DA).
The results are consistent with previous
studies that managers in companies with
higher debt levels in the company's capital
structure will provide a higher risk of fai-
lure (bankruptcy risk) so that management
has a greater motivation to manage earnings
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in order to avoid or reduce the risk of
capital structure, (Assih, 2004; Gul et al,
2003; Fanani, 2006).
Coefficients of DIVD (β1.2) is 0.0008 and
t value of 2.632 with a probability value
0.009, thus statistically significant at the 1%
level. Evidence showed any effect of divi-
dend policy on the level of earnings mana-
gement. These results support research
conducted by (Savov, 2006; Achmad, Subek-
ti dan Sari, 2007). These results show sup-
port for agency theory which states a
conflict between management and sharehol-
ders with respect to dividend policy. This
conflict occurs because shareholders have a
tendency to prefer dividends distributed in
large numbers, because it has a high cer-
tainty, otherwise the management does not
like big dividends, as it will reduce mana-
gement utility that is caused by the smaller
funds who is in control.
Coefficient of the variable INV (β1.3) is
0.1390 and t value of 5.217 with a proba-
bility value 0.000, thus statistically signi-
ficant at the 5% level. This means that the
management of the greater profits made by
companies have a large investment. These
results are consistent with research conduc-
ted by Savov (2006). These results indicate
that investment spending is intended to
maximize current shareholder wealth wi-
thout considering the interests of the compa
nies concerned, so that management tends
to invest too much to hope for a big profit
without considering the risk of the compa-
ny, and manage earnings in order perfor-
mance looks good by the investor.
GCG variable coefficients (β1.4) is -0.152
and the value of -1.938 with a probability
value 0.054, although weak statistically signi
ficant at the 10%. Direction of the negative
coefficient indicates that the effective inter-
nal oversight of corporate governance, the
smaller of management to manage earnings.
On Model 1, the coefficient of the variable
Size (ρ1.1) is -0.00053 and the value of -0.114
with a probability value of 0.910. This
means the size of the company's mana-
gement had no effect on earnings.
Model 2
Hypothesis of H2A tested by t value  to
test the significance of the partial coefficient
on LEV*GCG. Impact of GCG on the relati-
onship pemoderated LEV with DA indi-
cated by the coefficient of LEV*GCG (2.2).
Coefficient of the interaction between a com
pany's financial leverage and corporate
governance (2.2) is 0.051. t value of this
coefficient is 0.593 with a probability value
of 0.554. Concluded that the H02a can't
rejected. Empirical evidence is unable to
support the research hypothesis (H2A) that
influence a company's financial leverage at
the level of earnings management decreases
with increasing the effectiveness of internal
control of GCG. The results are not signi-
ficant due to companies in Indonesia for the
formation of a audit committee effective
begin year of 2004, so the supervision of the
audit committee has not been done. In
addition it has not been effective as a lack of
supervision of the commissioner and the
audit committee members who have finan-
cial expertise.
Hypothesis of H2B was tested by exami-
ning the significance of the coefficient of the
interaction between a firm's dividend by
GCG (DIVD * GCG) in Model 2. Interaction
coefficients DIVD*GCG (2.3) shows the
value of -0.0013 and the t value is -2.711
with probability value of 0.007. At 5%
significance level, it was concluded that H02c
successfully rejected. Coefficient indicates
the direction a positive direction, these
results indicate that corporate governance in
particular for internal control in Indonesia
could weaken the relationship of dividends
to earnings management. So the empirical
evidence suggests that the evidence sup-
ports the hypothesis of the research (H2B).
Hypothesis of H2C was tested by exami
ning the significance of the coefficient of the
interaction between investment companies
with corporate governance (INV*GCG).
Coefficient of INV*GCG (2.4) is -0,501 and
the value is -4.714 with  probability value of
0.000. At 5% significance, it was concluded
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that H02c successfully rejected. So the empiri
cal evidence suggests that the evidence
supports the research hypothesis (H2C). This
means that the effectiveness of internal
controls corporate governance (GCG) pe-
moderated influence on corporate invest-
ment relations to the level of earnings mana-
gement. These results indicate that the
investment problem is a very important
issue to gain effective control of the board
and audit committee so that management is
not free to manage for both profit and effici-
ency objectives of management for opportu-
nistic purposes.
b.   Analysis for Company That Listing In
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
Model 1
On Model 1, the coefficient of the vari-
able LEV (β1.1) are 0.024 and 2.743 for the
value of t value with probability value of
0.007, thus statistically significant at the 5%
level according to the predictions. This
means that the higher levels of corporate
leverage, the greater the level of accrual
accounting under management. The results
are consistent with previous studies that
managers in companies with higher debt
levels have a greater motivation to manage
earnings in order to avoid or reduce the risk
of capital structure (Assih, 2004).
DIVD variable coefficients (β1.2) is
0.0064 and t value of 0.593 with a proba-
bility value 0.554, thus not statistically signi-
ficant. Evidence showing no effect of devi-
dend policy on the level of earnings mana-
gement. Although not significant but the
coefficient indicates a positive direction sig-
nal in accordance with the theory which
states that dividends provide a positive
signal to the market and increase the stock
price (firm value). These results are consis-
tent with (Yurianto, 2000).
On Model 1, the coefficient of the varia-
ble INV (β1.3) is 0.0210 and t value of 2.739
with a probability value of 0.007, thus
statistically significant at the 5% level. This
means that the management of the greater
profits made by companies have a large
investment. These results are consistent
with the results of the companies listing on
the Stock Exchange and the result is also
consistent with (Savov, 2006).
Coefficient of GCG (β1.4) is 0.1710 and
the value of -2.140 with a t calculation proba
bility value 0.034, thus statistically signi-
ficant at the 5% level. This means more
effective internal controls of the smaller
GCG management to manage earnings.
Firm size as control variables is expec-
ted to have a positive impact on the accrual
basis of accounting under management,
because the larger the company the more
likely managers to manage earnings to
avoid or reduce the cost of political action
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Moses, 1987).
Coefficient of the Size (ρ1.1) is 0.0087 and t
value of 2.075 with a probability kalkulasian
value 0.040, thus statistically significant at
the 5% level. This means that the larger the
size of the company, the greater the chance
of management to manage earnings.
Model 2
Hypothesis of H2A tested by t value to
test the significance of the partial coefficient
on LEV*GCG. GCG variables influence the
relationship pemoderasian LEV with DA
indicated by the coefficient of LEV*GCG
(2.2). Coefficient of the interaction between a
company's financial leverage and corporate
governance (2.2) is 0.314.  t value of this
coefficient is 1.118 with a probability value
of 0.265. At a significance level of 5%, it was
concluded that the H02a not be denied.
Empirical evidence is unable to support the
research hypothesis (H2A) that influence a
company's financial leverage at the level the
greater earnings management by increasing
the effectiveness of internal control of GCG.
The results were not significant in Malaysia,
possibly because most of the sampled
companies studies suggest a family relati-
onship between shareholders, management
and board of Commissioner, so that the
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internal controls of the GCG is not desirable,
particularly with regard to the debt policy.
Hypothesis of H2B was tested by exami-
ning the significance of the coefficient of the
interaction between dividend companies
and corporate governance (GCG*DIVD) Inte
raction coefficients DIVD* GCG (2.3) shows
the value of -0.0125 and the t value is -0.448
with probability value of 0.655. At a signi-
ficance level of 5% , it was concluded that
H02b can not be denied. So the empirical
evidence suggests that the evidence did not
support the research hypothesis (H2B). This
means it can not prove that the great varia-
ble GCG treating the negative influence of
dividends on the level of earnings manage-
ment.
H2C hypothesis was tested by exami-
ning the significance of the coefficient of the
interaction between investment companies
with corporate governance (INV*GCG) in
Model 2. Coefficient of INV * GCG (2.4) is -
0.00784 and t kalkulasian value is 2.136 with
probability value of 0.034. At a significance
level of 5% one hand, it was concluded that
H02c rejected. So the empirical evidence
shows evidence supports the hypothesis of
the study (H2C). This means that the effec-
tiveness of internal controls corporate gover
nance moderated influence on corporate
investment relations to the level of earnings
management. The results indicate that the
more effective internal oversight of corpo-
rate governance it will reduce the impact of
investment on the behavior of management
to manage earnings.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS
Conclusion
From the research results can be conclu
ded that; The first, dividend policy in both
countries (Indonesia and Malaysia) none of
the motivators of management to manage
earnings, although moderated by the GCG
results were not significant. Second, Indo-
nesia and Malaysia supports the pecking
order theory and signaling theory to link
debt policy and investment policy. This
indicates that companies in Indonesia and
Malaysia stock market are great use of debt,
and investing their greater funding through
debt. Third, Internal control of corporate
governance (GCG) in Indonesia is much
lower than in Malaysia, so GCG can not
moderate the relationship of financial policy
(debt policy and dividend policy) on the
earnings management.
RECOMMENDATION
Recommendations can be given in this
study is: The first, next study is expected to
use other of earnings management mea-
sures by using models offered by Whelan
and McNamara (2004).  The difference with
the old model is, discretionary accruals that
are broken down into components of short-
term and long-term. Therefore, the separa-
tion is expected to further elucidate the role
of each component of discretionary accruals
in earnings management. The use of these
new models aim to see the consistency of
the results so the results can be more benefi
cial to the company. Second, to examine in
other industries with a longer observation
in order to provide better results. Third, to
improve internal control index of corporate
governance in this study for example by
adding the points relevant to the question
by sending a questionnaire. The next study
is also expected to connect the company's
policy on the management of earnings by
looking at the market reaction, in order to
further strengthen the results of the analy-
sis. Finally, If you want to continue or
expand this research is expected to consider
funding constraints (high/low) as the Karo
(2004) did.
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Appendix 1
Measurement of  GCG
Scoring Criteria and their weights.
Presence of Board of Commisionar: weight 45%, Audit Committee: Weight 20%,
Management: Weight 20%, Shareholder: Weight 15%
1. BOARD OF COMMISSIONER (45%)
a. COM_SIZE (Size of commissioner):
Range : Score
0 – 3    2
4 – 6    4
6 – 8    6
9 -11    8
           >11  10
b. COM_IND (Independent commisionar)
Range: Score
0% – 20%    2
21% – 40%    4
41% – 60%    6
61% - 80%    8
          81 and above  10
c. %COMOWN
Range: Score
0% – 20%    2
21% – 40%    4
41% – 60%    6
61% - 80%    8
           81 and above  10
d. AUD (Big four)
Range Score
Ya    5
Tidak    0
2. AUDIT COMMITTEE (20%)
a. AUD_SIZE (Size of Audit Committee):
Range: Score
0 – 3    2
4 – 6    4
6 – 8    6
9 -11    8
            >11   10
b. AUD_IND (Independent Audit Committee)
Range: Score
0% – 20%    2
21% – 40%    4
41% – 60%    6
61% - 80%    8
          81 and above  10
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c. FINEXPERT
Range Score
Ya    5
Tidak    0
3.  MANAGEMENT (20%)
     a.    DIR_SIZE
Range: Score
0 – 3    2
4 – 6    4
6 – 8    6
9 -11    8
            >11 10
    b.    M_OWN (Managerial ownership)
Range: Score
0% – 20%    2
21% – 40%    4
41% – 60%    6
61% - 80%    8
81 nd above    10
c. Family relations
Range Score
Yes    0
No    5
4. SHAREHOLDER (15%)
INST_OWN ( Institutional Ownership)
  Range: Score
0% – 20% 10
21% – 40%  8
41% – 60% 6
61% - 80% 4
81 and above 2
